Monday, Jul 07, 2025 10:00 [IST]
Last Update: Sunday, Jul 06, 2025 16:54 [IST]
The resumption of the Kailash Manasarovar Yatra in 2025 has captured the attention of both diplomatic observers and the broader Indian public. After a four-year suspension due to the Covid-19 pandemic and the violent Galwan Valley clash in June 2020, the pilgrimage to the sacred Mount Kailash and Lake Manasarovar has resumed, with coordinated efforts between the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On the surface, this revival may appear as a step towards normalisation of bilateral ties. However, beneath this veneer of civilizational bonhomie lies an unresolved and simmering geopolitical reality. The so-called thaw is better understood as a calculated diplomatic maneuver rather than an indication of genuine rapprochement.
The first batch of Indian pilgrims—numbering between 650 and 700, selected through a lottery system from around 5,000 applicants—has completed their spiritual journey across the border into Tibet’s Burang County. The historic 52-kilometre circumambulation, known as the Parikrama or Kora, around Mount Kailash is once again drawing people of various faiths, reaffirming its timeless spiritual significance. The Chinese ambassador to India has gone out of his way to highlight the civilizational links between the two ancient nations, using the resumption of the Yatra as a symbolic gesture of friendship and cooperation.
Yet, seasoned analysts remain skeptical. While the reopening of the Manasarovar route serves as a positive development in people-to-people exchanges, the broader strategic environment remains fraught with distrust and military tension. Even though disengagement has occurred in some friction points along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), de-escalation remains elusive. China continues to strengthen its military infrastructure along the LAC, constructing dual-use facilities that serve both civilian and military purposes. Satellite imagery and intelligence assessments indicate a 30% increase in Chinese troop deployment in the Tibetan plateau, directly facing Indian forward positions.
In response, India has been left with little choice but to bolster its own border infrastructure. The Border Roads Organisation (BRO) has intensified its work on road connectivity, advanced landing grounds, and logistical supply routes across Arunachal Pradesh, Ladakh, and Uttarakhand. The government’s push for self-reliance in defense production and recent induction of high-altitude warfare capabilities like the Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) further signal that India is not taking the Chinese build-up lightly.
Even outside the military domain, China's actions have continued to cause concern. The Chinese government’s decision to restrict rare earth exports has impacted India's manufacturing sectors, especially the automotive industry, which relies heavily on these materials for battery and electronics production. Furthermore, China created procedural hurdles in sending trained technicians to Foxconn’s iPhone manufacturing plant in India, delaying critical production timelines. These examples illustrate that despite the optics of normalisation, Beijing has not refrained from using economic levers to exert pressure on India’s strategic sectors.
Perhaps the most telling indicator of the underlying strain is India’s continued refusal to restore direct flight connectivity with China. Commercial flights between the two countries have remained suspended since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, with tensions further exacerbated by the Galwan clash and China’s more recent conduct during India’s cross-border Operation Sindoor in 2025. During this operation, which targeted terror infrastructure in Pakistan, China reportedly extended operational support to Pakistan, including intelligence-sharing and electronic surveillance assistance—an act that has further soured New Delhi’s perception of Beijing’s strategic intentions.
India’s investment policy also reflects this guarded stance. The restriction imposed in April 2020 requiring prior government approval for foreign direct investments from countries sharing land borders with India—essentially aimed at China—remains firmly in place. While there was speculation earlier this year about a potential relaxation, the Indian government has deliberately delayed any such decision, especially in light of China’s actions during Operation Sindoor.
Why then, one may ask, does India seek to maintain even this limited level of engagement with China? The answer lies in the complex calculus of statecraft. Permanent hostility between two nuclear-armed neighbours is neither sustainable nor desirable. Diplomatic communication channels, trade dependencies, and regional multilateral forums like BRICS and SCO necessitate at least a minimal working relationship. Moreover, a complete diplomatic freeze would only limit India’s room for maneuver in global and regional geopolitics.
China, for its part, has its own reasons for temporarily cooling tensions. Beijing is increasingly focused on strategic competition with the United States, which is taking concrete form through trade wars, technology embargoes, and military posturing in the Indo-Pacific. In such a scenario, a volatile border with India is an unnecessary distraction for Xi Jinping’s leadership. Stabilizing the LAC—even superficially—allows China to concentrate resources on its Pacific theater and domestic economic challenges.
Further, Beijing’s outreach via the Kailash Manasarovar Yatra could be viewed as an attempt to project an image of magnanimity and cultural accommodation, especially at a time when it faces growing international criticism over its human rights record in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet itself. The controlled resumption of the pilgrimage serves as a low-cost, high-visibility diplomatic tool for China to soften its image, particularly within the Indian public sphere.
Yet, the Indian strategic community remains wary of Beijing’s long-term intentions. Analysts point out that such gestures from China have, in the past, been used as pressure points during border negotiations or trade talks. The fear remains that the opening of the ManasarovarYatra route could later be weaponized as a bargaining chip by Beijing to extract political concessions from New Delhi on unrelated issues, such as Arunachal Pradesh or India’s growing defense cooperation with Western powers like the United States, Japan, and Australia.
The reality is that while cultural exchanges and people-to-people contacts like the Yatra are welcome developments, they cannot substitute for substantive progress on the core issues that divide the two countries. The Line of Actual Control remains contested, direct flights remain suspended, trade remains heavily skewed in China’s favor, and Beijing’s strategic embrace of Pakistan continues to complicate India’s security environment.
The current thaw,
symbolized by the resumption of the Manasarovar Yatra, is best understood as a
tactical pause in overt hostilities rather than a genuine strategic reset. For
now, both India and China appear to be managing their differences with a mix of
pragmatism and caution. However, deep-rooted mistrust, unresolved territorial
disputes, and competing regional ambitions ensure that this phase of relative
calm remains fragile and potentially short-lived. India’s strategic posture
going forward will likely continue to balance limited engagement with firm deterrence—a
necessity in a neighborhood where power asymmetries and historical grievances
run deep.
