The Question of Sikkim, Darjeeling and its people

Dilu Sharma Gangtok, Sikkim

There are moments when history returns to public discourse not as memory, but as political geography. The recent debate surrounding the proposed pathways for a permanent political settlement in the Darjeeling Hills is one such moment. It has also revived an older and more emotionally charged question in Sikkim: whether the historical relationship between Darjeeling and Sikkim should eventually find expression in a political or territorial reunification. That sentiment deserves to be understood rather than ridiculed. The historical connection is real. Darjeeling was transferred by the Chogyal of Sikkim to the East India Company through the Deed of Grant of 1835. The historical record of the Darjeeling district itself acknowledges that the territory had previously formed part of the dominions of Sikkim. The British Library’s Sikkim Palace Archives also contain extensive archival material concerning the cession of Darjeeling and the relationship between the Sikkim court and the East India Company. But history can establish a relationship without establishing a contemporary constitutional claim. That distinction is fundamental. A historical connection is not, by itself, a constitutional argument for territorial reorganisation. Nations and states are not static archaeological maps. They are institutions built through successive political settlements, administrative arrangements, demographic transformations and constitutional processes. The Darjeeling of 1835 and the Sikkim of 2026 may share an extraordinary historical geography, but they exist within entirely different institutional realities. This is precisely why the contemporary suggestion of bringing the two political geographies together requires considerably more scrutiny than an invocation of shared history.

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There is a powerful emotional argument among sections of Sikkimese society that Darjeeling and Sikkim constitute a historically connected Himalayan space artificially separated by colonial arrangements. That sentiment is understandable. But sentiment and statecraft operate by different rules. Darjeeling’s historical trajectory after 1835 was fundamentally different from Sikkim’s. Darjeeling became part of the British Indian administrative system and, following independence, remained within the Indian Union. Sikkim followed a very different constitutional journey and became a full-fledged state of India in 1975. This difference matters enormously. For well over a century, Darjeeling developed within the institutional ecosystem of British India and subsequently independent India. Its educational institutions, administrative structures, transport networks, economic linkages and access to the wider Indian metropolitan system evolved through that trajectory. Sikkim, meanwhile, followed its own political and institutional path before its merger with India. Therefore, to imagine that the two regions could simply be placed together today because they once formed part of the same historical political landscape is to underestimate the accumulated effects of nearly two centuries of divergent institutional development. The question is not whether Darjeeling and Sikkim are historically connected. They unquestionably are. The question is whether historical connectedness necessarily requires political reunification. It does not.

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One of the less discussed dimensions of the Darjeeling-Sikkim question is the cumulative effect of differential access to institutions. Darjeeling’s incorporation into British India gave the region an early interface with the educational, administrative and economic institutions of the Indian mainland. Over generations, this produced an institutional ecosystem that connected Darjeeling’s population with Bengal, Calcutta and subsequently the broader Indian educational and professional system. Sikkim’s trajectory was different. This is not an argument about one society being inherently more capable than another. Nor is it an argument that one Himalayan population has a greater historical claim to achievement. It is an argument about institutional exposure. Educational opportunity, access to universities, administrative networks, professional competition, migration, markets and metropolitan connections accumulate over generations. They create social capital that cannot simply be reset by drawing a new boundary. That is why any serious discussion of political integration must examine not merely territory, ethnicity and historical memory, but also the institutional consequences of integration. Would the proposed arrangement reduce disparities Would it improve educational access? Would it expand economic opportunity? Would it protect Sikkim’s constitutional particularities? Would it preserve Darjeeling’s political aspirations? Would both populations actually consent to such an arrangement? These are far more consequential questions than whether a nineteenth-century map can be reconstructed.

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The immediate controversy arose from a preliminary document associated with Prof. Mahendra P. Lama proposing four possible pathways for a permanent political solution to the Darjeeling question. This came in the context of the Central Government’s efforts, following Union Home Minister Amit Shah’s discussions with Gorkha leaders, to develop a constitutional framework for a permanent political settlement. The Ministry of Home Affairs subsequently constituted a high-level committee headed by former Deputy National Security Adviser Pankaj Kumar Singh. The eight-page preliminary document, titled "Roadmap for Permanent Political Solution: 4 Alternatives," included a fourth pathway referring to a North Bengal State and/or contiguous areas of neighbouring states. Since Sikkim is a contiguous neighbouring state, this naturally created concern in Sikkim. Prof. Lama later clarified that he had submitted only a three-point proposal and that the fourth option was not part of his final submission. He also clarified that the document contained no map or explicit proposal to include Sikkim and that the disputed fourth pathway was subsequently dropped from the final submission to the Government of India. That clarification should be acknowledged. However, it does not remove the larger question of institutional responsibility.

Prof. Lama is not merely an academic commenting from outside government. He has been serving as an Economic Adviser to the Government of Sikkim with Cabinet-rank status and, in 2026, has also been associated with the preparation of the Sikkim Vision 2047 exercise. Such a position demands a higher standard of institutional responsibility. His involvement with both the Government of Sikkim and discussions concerning the political future of Darjeeling creates, at the very least, an appearance of a conflict of interest. The issue is not about questioning his loyalty or his contribution to either region. It is about whether one person can fairly and credibly serve two potentially competing institutional interests at the same time. Continuing to hold both positions while attempting to explain the resulting ambiguity risks damaging not only his own credibility, but also the legitimacy and public confidence in the institutions with which he is associated. The issue, therefore, should not be reduced to allegations of betrayal. The more serious question is whether a person holding a senior advisory position in one state should simultaneously participate in developing political or constitutional alternatives concerning a neighbouring region when those alternatives could potentially affect the territorial and constitutional interests of the state he advises. In such circumstances, even the appearance of divided institutional responsibility can warrant recusal, separation of roles, or resignation from one of the positions. Therefore, the Government of Sikkim would be justified in seeking complete institutional clarity: either Prof. Lama should be relieved of his governmental advisory responsibilities if he wishes to devote himself to the political aspirations of Darjeeling, or he should step away from the Darjeeling-related exercise and continue serving the Government and people of Sikkim with an undivided institutional mandate. Such a step would not necessarily be a judgement on his intellectual contribution or personal integrity. Rather, it would reaffirm the principle that public office demands clarity of responsibility, particularly when questions of territory, constitutional identity and political representation are involved.

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Perhaps the greatest reason to resist simplistic narratives about merger is that Sikkim and Darjeeling have something more valuable than an old territorial relationship: they have a living social relationship. Families, communities, educational institutions, cultural organisations, professional networks and ordinary people cross the administrative boundary every day. The relationship between the people of Sikkim and Darjeeling is not merely historical; it is contemporary and deeply human. A territorial argument that transforms this relationship into a contest over historical ownership could produce precisely the opposite of what its proponents intend. Instead of bringing people closer, it could create suspicion. Instead of strengthening Himalayan solidarity, it could produce competing territorial nationalisms. Instead of recognising a shared cultural inheritance, it could turn that inheritance into an argument over who possesses it. There is an irony here. The people of Sikkim and Darjeeling have lived as neighbours for generations. They do not need a common administrative boundary to justify their cultural relationship. Perhaps the more sophisticated vision is therefore not political merger, but functional integration without territorial absorption.  The two regions can cooperate on tourism, education, environment, disaster management, transportation, mountain economies, cultural heritage, entrepreneurship and regional infrastructure while retaining their respective constitutional and administrative identities. In the twenty-first century, connectivity does not require redrawing boundaries. The 1835 Deed of Grant is an important historical document. It deserves to be studied, remembered and critically interpreted. But history should illuminate contemporary choices, not dictate them. The fact that Darjeeling once formed part of Sikkim’s political domain does not automatically mean that Darjeeling belongs in Sikkim today. Equally, the fact that Darjeeling has developed within West Bengal does not erase its complex Himalayan history. Both truths can coexist. The challenge for intellectuals and policymakers is to move beyond the binary of belonging and ownership. The real question is how the Himalayan societies of Sikkim, Darjeeling, Kalimpong and the wider eastern Himalayan region can secure greater prosperity, institutional capacity, cultural confidence and political dignity without turning their shared history into a source of permanent territorial antagonism. For Sikkim, this requires confidence rather than insecurity. A state that understands its history does not need to reclaim every territory that once belonged to an earlier political formation. Its strength lies in building institutions so effective, distinctive and forward-looking that its present becomes more consequential than its past. And for Darjeeling, the search for a durable political settlement should be judged on the basis of what it delivers to its people, not on how effectively it rearranges historical boundaries. The most dangerous mistake would be to confuse historical memory with constitutional destiny. Darjeeling and Sikkim may have once occupied a common historical landscape. They can continue to share a common cultural and economic future without necessarily becoming one political entity. History explains where we came from. It does not, by itself, decide where we must go.