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Last Update: Tuesday, Oct 07, 2025 17:29 [IST]
The devastating 2023 Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF)
that tore through Sikkim is fast becoming an old story. The initial storm of
national news has passed, central relief funds have been distributed, and the
public memory has begun to fade. For many, it's a familiar cycle: a tragedy
occurs, some relief provides a temporary balm, and taxpayer money, much like
the Chungthang Dam itself, is washed away as people are forced to move on. But
to let this disaster recede into history is to ignore the uncomfortable truths
buried beneath the silt.This was not merely an event that happened, it was an
event that was arguably allowed to happen. Behind the tragic loss of life and
resources lies a disturbing trail of ignored warnings, questionable planning,
and a cascade of decisions that prioritized development over safety. It's time
to ask the critical questions that were silenced by the roar of the
floodwaters.This article will delve into the hidden truths behind the disaster
by seeking answers to four fundamental questions:
By breaking down the evidence surrounding these issues,
this article will highlight the chain of events and systemic failures that led
to the catastrophe. It will lay out the facts and allow you, the reader, to
decide: Was the Sikkim flood an unavoidable natural disaster, or was it a
predictable, man-made catastrophe born from a staggering degree of negligence?
Ignored
research and reports
The devastating Glacial Lake Outburst
Flood (GLOF) that struck Sikkim was not an unforeseen catastrophe,it was a
scientifically modelled and predicted disaster. In a 2021 research paper, two
years before the event, Dr. AshimSattar
and his collaborators published a chillingly accurate forecast of the
very GLOF scenario that unfolded from South Lhonak Lake. Their work was not a
vague possibility but a specific warning, highlighting that settlements like
Chungthang were at high risk and that floodwaters could reach depths of 20-30
meters with destructive velocities. The research was a clear and urgent call to
action. The article explicitly stated that "GLOF risk mitigation in
relation to South Lhonak and other critical lakes in the basin is of utmost
importance(3),"
especially after the construction of the dam at Chungthang. The study provided the base data needed to create effective
risk management plans and, crucially, to
design an Early Warning System (EWS) that could have saved countless
lives. This vital piece of scientific information, published and
publicly available, was a roadmap to preventing the exact tragedy that
occurred. Despite the precision of the warning, it appears to have been
tragically ignored by the competent authorities and concerned departments.
While research articles are a primary source of critical information, there was
a clear failure to translate this scientific foresight into proactive policy
and on-the-ground action. The fact that GLOF studies are being commissioned
now, after the loss of so many
lives and widespread destruction, is a reactive measure that highlights a
profound lapse in governance. The tools to mitigate this disaster were
available; the will to implement them was absent. The community is now left to
hope that this devastating event forces immediate and lasting change. The
implementation of a robust Early Warning System must be the top priority to
ensure that the next potential GLOF does not lead to another tragedy. However,
this is also a moment that demands accountability. We must ask why such a
clear, data-driven warning from our own scientific community was nullified by
inaction. The people of Sikkim deserve more than just post-disaster studies;
they deserve a system that listens to science and acts to protect its citizens before tragedy strikes.
Sikkim's
largest and most expensive hydropower project, Teesta III, was plagued by massive delays and cost overruns.Initially estimated at $683 million, its final cost more than doubled to $1.69 billion, and it was completed
five years behind schedule in 2017.The project was awarded to a consortium led by the Athena Group
through its special company, Teesta Urja Limited (TUL). The selection was controversial because the state cabinet had
previously rejected a government committee's recommendation for a different
company for reasons that were not made public. According to a report by India's
national auditor (CAG), Athena India was
a brand-new company with no prior experience in building hydro projects
when it was awarded the contract. The report criticized the government for not
verifying the consortium leader's qualifications. As per the deal, the state
government of Sikkim took a 26% equity stake in the project.
Rivers
of Light, Villages in Darkness
The state uses its powerful rivers to create a lot of
electricity from big dams. But instead of this power going to the people who
live in Sikkim, most of it is sold to other states. This leaves many of
Sikkim’s own villages facing frequent power cuts, often for many hours a day.To
build these huge power projects, local people had to give up a lot. Many had to
leave the land where their families had lived for generations. The rivers,
which are very important to their daily life and culture, were blocked and
changed forever. This damages the environment and can cause more dangerous
landslides, but the people were told it was necessary for a better future.The
main reason for this problem is that the big power companies have deals to sell
the electricity to other, richer states. These deals are worth a lot of money,
so the needs of Sikkim's own people are often ignored. It’s incredibly unfair
that a child in a Sikkim’s village can't
do their homework at night because there's no light, while the dam near their
home is busy sending electricity to a big city hundreds of miles away.It’s
hard to point a finger at just one group. The problem is complicated. Part of
the blame might be on the state's power department, which may not have the
right wires and equipment to deliver electricity to all the remote villages.
Another part of the blame is on the big dam companies, who are more focused on
making money from their contracts than on helping the local communities.Although
12% of the power produced are shared1
with the state but problem still persist. It's a mix of poor management and a
lack of care for the people.In the end, this is a story of a broken promise.
The people of Sikkim were told that if they allowed their land and rivers to be
used, they would get development and basic needs like 24/7 electricity. But
that hasn't happened. They have been left with the problems, like environmental
damage, while the main benefit the electricity is sent somewhere else. It is
only fair that the people who make the biggest sacrifices are the first to
enjoy the rewards.
A Call for
Accountability and Future Action
The evidence presented paints a clear
picture. The 2023 GLOF was not a singular event but the catastrophic climax of
a story of systemic failure. The decision to ignore clear scientific warnings
from research was not an isolated mistake, it was consistent with a governance
model that greenlit the massively over-budget Teesta III project with an inexperienced
developer and failed to deliver even basic electricity to the very people who
sacrificed their land. Each thread ,the ignored science, the flawed economics,
and the social injustice, weaves together to show a system that has long
prioritized questionable development over scientific warnings and citizen
welfare.So, who is to blame? The answer is not a single person or department
but a profound and multifaceted failure of governance. Blame lies with the
authorities who dismissed credible science, the policymakers who pursued a
flawed hydro-economic model at any cost, and a system that has repeatedly
treated the people and environment of Sikkim as collateral damage. The roaring
floodwaters of the Teesta were not just an act of nature; they were the
inevitable result of a development path that was both unsustainable and
unjust.Moving forward cannot mean moving on. True recovery demands
accountability, beginning with a transparent investigation into why the 2021
warning was shelved. It requires an urgent, independent re-evaluation of every
dam on the Teesta, placing ecological reality above contractual obligations.
Most importantly, it necessitates the immediate implementation of a
comprehensive Early Warning System and a new framework where the safety and
prosperity of the Sikkimese people are non-negotiable priorities. The 2023 GLOF
was not an unavoidable natural disaster. It was a man-made catastrophe born
from negligence. The question now is whether the lessons paid for in lives and
livelihoods will finally be learned or not.
References-
1.
https://power.sikkim.gov.in/visitor/projectsdata/22
3. Sattar, A., Goswami, A., Kulkarni, A. V., Emmer, A., Haritashya, U. K., Allen, S., ... &Huggel, C. (2021). Future glacial lake outburst flood (GLOF) hazard of the South Lhonak Lake, Sikkim Himalaya. Geomorphology, 388, 107783.
(Yougal Sapkota is a scholar at Centre for Atmospheric and Climate Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, Madras. Views are personal. Email: yooglesaps@gmail.com)